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Executive Summary
This case examines various aspects of food price 
instability. It focuses on [1] the sources of price 
instability, [2] various policy options and the condi­
tions under which they are viable, and [3] 
experiences with both market-based and non­
market-based policy responses to price instability. 
All sources of price instability— such as inadequate 
infrastructure, asymmetric information, and incom­
plete or missing institutions— qualify as market 
failure. One could therefore argue that an appro­
priate policy response would be to invest in the 
critical determinants of well-functioning markets 
and create enabling market conditions, which in 
turn improve price stability. But the proponents of 
direct government interventions have argued that it 
takes time to develop infrastructure, improve 
information flow, and build institutions, and hence 
direct intervention for price stabilization is a legiti­
mate short-run policy response. This is the idea 
most developing countries adopted when they 
embarked on food price stabilization policies in the 
1960s and 1970s.
Over the years, however, it became clear that such 
policies are expensive, may be dictated by special 
interests, and can distort agricultural incentives. 
These problems were particularly relevant for 
marketing board-led price controls in centrally 
planned economies. In Asian countries, most of 
which adopted dual pricing policies, interventions 
did produce beneficial results during the early years 
of the Green Revolution. But recent studies suggest 
that Asian food price stabilization is plagued by the 
very problems that the opponents had predicted 
with their theoretical models. These programs are 
becoming increasingly expensive, being captured by 
special interests, and hindering the process of 
diversification and commercialization. Furthermore, 
some countries in the region have demonstrated 
that reductions in public intervention can be bene­
ficial. The Asian countries that adopted liberaliza­
tion have been able to reduce food subsidy bills, 
strengthen markets, and allocate more resources to 
poverty alleviation programs— all without jeopard­
izing food price stability.
Given the policy vacuum created by liberalization 
and the increasing affordability of information and 
communication technologies, recent years have
seen many initiatives in developing countries to set 
up market-based institutions, such as commodity 
exchanges, for managing price instability and risks. 
Some countries have also used international futures 
markets to protect their domestic market against 
global market volatility. In most cases, however, 
these initiatives have not produced the desired 
results, and addressing price instability continues to 
be a challenge for many developing countries. This 
case provides an overview of these challenges with 
the hope of stimulating critical thinking about 
policy solutions that can ensure an acceptable level 
of price stability, especially in low-income countries 
in Africa.
Your assignment is to consider a low-income, land­
locked country in Africa with poor infrastructure 
and to recommend a set of policies to the govern­
ment that would ensure an acceptable level of price 
stability for agricultural commodities. For decades, 
the country controlled agricultural prices through 
its marketing boards, which heavily distorted agri­
cultural production incentives. Beginning in 1999 
the country started dismantling its marketing 
boards and liberalizing agricultural markets. With 
liberalization, however, prices have become more 
volatile, and there has been increasing pressure on 
the government to undertake stabilization policies.
Background
Agricultural households in developing countries 
face a variety of risks. The most visible manifesta­
tion of these risks is high food price instability, 
which, because of its inherent economic and politi­
cal implications, has attracted the attention of 
almost all actors in food policy making over the 
past few decades. Politicians want food price stabil­
ity irrespective of their ideology; public administra­
tors have struggled to make food price policies 
work; and researchers have debated the ways and 
means of ensuring food price stability. All actors 
agree on one point— the dire consequences of 
price instability for consumers, producers, and 
overall economic growth. It is well documented 
that if the markets for credit and insurance are 
incomplete, commodity price instability can dis­
courage investments and lead to inefficient
resource allocation.1 For poor consumers, the 
consequences of price instability can be severe. 
Because they spend a large share of their income 
on food, an unusual price increase forces them to 
cut down food intake, take their children out of 
school, or, in extreme cases, simply to starve.2 A  
series of country studies have argued that price 
instability may result in macroeconomic instability, 
social unrest, and overall reduction in economic 
growth.3
Thus, the issue is not finding policy justifications 
for ensuring price stability, but rather finding 
appropriate policy instruments and institutions to 
address it— a subject that was intensely debated in 
the 1970s and 1980s and has received renewed 
attention in recent years.4 The traditional policy 
response has consisted of direct government inter­
ventions in food markets, through food marketing 
boards or parastatals, involving price controls and 
restrictions on both internal and external trade. 
Beginning in the 1980s, donors and other inter­
national agencies began promoting the reform of 
the food marketing boards and price policies as 
part of structural adjustment programs. This ap­
proach was motivated by the prevailing view at the 
time that direct marketing interventions in the 
food sector were too costly to continue. The 
reform experiences have been mixed, and whether 
the reforms provided positive price incentives is a 
subject of considerable debate [Barrett 1997; Jayne 
et al. 2002; Dorward et al. 2004],
In light of these mixed experiences with structural 
adjustment programs as well as other global trends, 
it is being increasingly recognized that food price
1 For further details, see Newbery and Stiglitz [1981], 
Timmer [1988], Williams and Wright [1991], Fafchamps 
[1992], and Barrett [2002],
2 Even if these shocks are temporary, they can have long­
term economic impacts in terms of nutritional well-being, 
labor productivity, and survival chances [Hoddinott 
2006],
3 This has been a main theme of Peter Timmer's research 
for more than two decades. For Indonesia, he demon­
strated that a stabilized rice price raised the country's 
growth rates by 16 percent during 1969-1974, by 14 
percent during 1974-1979, and by 4 percent during 
1989-1991 over what it would have been otherwise 
[Timmer 1997], For further discussion of the social and 
political justifications for price stabilization, see Timmer 
[1988,1996],
4 See Timmer [1988, 1996] and references therein on the
debate and World Bank [2005] on recent issues.
instability and risk are important problems in many 
low-income countries, and finding appropriate 
policy responses for dealing with these problems 
has re-emerged as a contemporary policy issue 
[Byerlee et al. 2006; World Bank 2005], There are 
at least three reasons behind renewed interest in 
the subject. First, it is becoming evident that food 
market reforms have been partial, and in the wake 
of increased price volatility, many countries are 
reversing the policies they adopted under the 
structural adjustment programs.5 Second, world 
grain stock is at historically low levels, and even a 
relatively small swing in exports or imports from 
large countries, such as China and India, can send 
major shock waves through world grain markets. 
This vulnerability has serious implications for 
developing countries, especially those that have 
food deficits and limited capacity to import owing 
to low foreign currency reserves. Finally, there is 
growing concern that global climate change is likely 
to expose poor countries to droughts, floods, and 
other extreme climatic events that can increase the 
risk of food price shocks.
Instability in agricultural prices results from a num­
ber of interrelated factors. It is important to note 
that such instability can often be triggered by one 
factor, like bad weather, and then be accelerated by 
other related factors, such as inadequate infra­
structure and institutions. Broadly, one can divide 
these factors into four major groups: [1] agro- 
climatic factors, [2] inadequate infrastructure and 
asymmetric information, [3] incomplete or missing 
institutions, and [4] high volatility in the world 
market.
Agroclimatic Factors
The hostility of Mother Nature has historically 
been one of the main sources of peasant 
households' vulnerability. Droughts, floods, and 
endemic infestations of crops have always played 
roles in food insecurity and resultant human 
tragedies. The production from weather-dependent 
agriculture, as is the case in most developing 
countries, can be as unpredictable as the weather 
itself, as shown by the variability in production 
within and across years. It has been amply 
demonstrated that yield variability translates into 
price variability, and the more a country's
5 See Jayne et al. [2002] for Eastern and Southern 
African experiences.
agriculture depends on weather, the more variable 
yields and prices are.6 The reasons are obvious 
when one observes how prices collapse following a 
bumper harvest and skyrocket after a crop failure.7
Infrastructure and Information
The price of any given commodity is the final out­
come of an exchange process we call the market, and 
the outcome is only as good as the process is able to 
deliver. Thus, the price of a commodity can be right 
only if the process of exchange is right. Three critical 
determinants of an efficient process of exchange [or 
market] are infrastructure, institutions, and informa­
tion.8 Two examples can help make the point clear. 
First, the results of the "getting-prices-right" cam­
paign of the 1980s, which involved dismantling 
parastatals and allowing market forces to determine 
prices, varied widely across countries. Whereas 
liberalization led to higher price variability and subse­
quent policy reversals in some African countries, it 
was remarkably successful in China and Vietnam—  
arguably because they had better infrastructure and 
institutions. Second, famines and acute food inse­
curity have historically been localized phenomena, 
and many of them are named after a specific region 
of a country, such as the Wello famine in Ethiopia 
and the Bengal and Madras famines in India. The 
classic example is the Bengal Famine of 1943, which 
tragically demonstrated how a small decline in food 
production can trigger massive food insecurity in the 
absence of infrastructure, information, and risk- 
mitigating institutions. Food price stabilization 
policies have their roots in such tragic experiences.
Incomplete Markets: Credit and Insurance
Life always involves risks, but over time the human 
race has learned how to manage or cope with them. 
The credit and insurance markets are the outcomes 
of such human learning. In developing countries, 
however, these institutions are largely incomplete 
or nonfunctional, and thus inadequate to address 
the credit and insurance needs of the vast majority 
of households. This failure indirectly contributes to 
agricultural risks and price instability. For instance,
6 See Anderson and Hazell [1989] on sources of yield 
variability.
7 The consequences of such shocks on the poor are also 
well documented. See Barrett [2002] for a review.
8 Strictly speaking, these are not sources of price insta­
bility per se, but the lack or inadequacy of these 
elements amplifies the degree of instability.
if the credit market functions well, households can 
borrow to maintain a certain level of consumption 
or to avoid distress sales in the face of negative 
income shocks. In many developing countries 
farmers must sell a portion of their crops imme­
diately after the harvest to pay off loans, pay wages 
or school fees, or meet other social obligations. 
This is one of the reasons behind the stylized fact 
that prices decline after harvest in developing coun­
tries. Furthermore, a large body of literature argues 
that access to credit markets can reduce or delay 
the loss of productive assets through distress sales, 
which are detrimental to long-run productivity and 
growth.
The same argument applies to insurance markets. 
Farmers in developing countries have great diffi­
culty dealing with weather-related income shocks 
owing to missing insurance markets. Crop failure 
due to drought, for example, can force households, 
otherwise above the poverty line, into poverty 
because they must sell their productive assets to 
meet consumption requirements and production 
costs. As the next section will show, the develop­
ment of credit and insurance markets is also critical 
to ensure food price stability through market-based 
institutions.
The Volatility of the World Food Market
The world staple food market has historically been 
thin, highly volatile, and heavily influenced by agri­
cultural policies in developed countries [Timmer 
1996], This description was particularly true in the 
1960s, when only about 6-7 million metric tons of 
rice, 46 million tons of wheat, and 23 million tons 
of maize were traded in the world market. The 
global market has increased in size over time 
[almost three times its size in the 1960s], but it 
remains volatile, with intrayear coefficients of varia­
tion reaching as high as 20.73 for rice, 16.9 for 
wheat, and 17.47 for maize over the past two 
decades.9 Many studies have documented that high 
variability in world prices can be transmitted to 
domestic markets and worsen price instability. For 
net importing countries, the financial and balance- 
of-payments implications can be severe. For exam­
ple, a sudden increase in food imports may worsen 
the balance of trade, causing a devaluation of the 
currency and making imports more expensive in 
local currency [Hazell et al. 2005],
9 Calculations are based on data from the U.S. Depart­
ment of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service.
Other Factors Contributing to Price 
Instability
Two other factors can contribute to food price 
instability in developing countries. First, most 
developing countries have social safety net [SSN] 
programs to provide poor households with access 
to food. These programs are essential for all coun­
tries, irrespective of their level of development. If 
they are not managed properly, however, their 
operations can have destabilizing effects on 
markets, especially if the programs are large relative 
to the country's food economy. Although the 
direction of the price change may be different, 
both food transfers and cash transfers under SSN 
programs can affect the price. For instance, if bene­
ficiaries receive food under SSN programs, it will 
lower their effective demand from the market, 
which in turn will lead to a decline in prices. If it is 
a cash transfer program, on the other hand, 
increased income will lead to an increase in demand 
and, for a given level of supply, an increase in 
prices. Thus, in either case, the market equilibrium 
will change, which in turn will change farmers' 
incentives and traders' arbitrage opportunities.
The other factor is food aid flow. Although the 
benefits of food aid supply during emergencies 
cannot be denied, excessive flows can depress 
market prices to the detriment of local producers, 
lowering levels of production and farmer incomes. 
This is particularly true for program food aid, 
which has historically been driven by the disposal 
of surpluses in donor countries rather than food 
security needs and incentives for domestic produc­
tion in recipient countries. Consider the case of 
Ethiopia, one of the largest recipients of food aid. 
According to a conservative estimate, total food 
aid accounted for 13 percent of cereal use in the 
country during 1999-2003. The share of food aid 
in total human consumption is at least twice as 
high, because in addition to human consumption, 
cereal use includes feed, seed, and postharvest 
losses [FA O  2004). Clearly, it is a large share and, 
depending on the mode of distribution, can pro­
duce disincentive effects for both producers and 
traders.
Policy Options
From a theoretical standpoint, the central rationale 
for policy intervention to ensure price stability lies 
in the arguments of “ market failure." In fact, three
commonly cited rationales for public interventions 
in agricultural markets— [1] inadequate infra­
structure, [2] incomplete risk-mitigating institutions 
like credit and insurance markets, and [3] lack of 
safeguards against external shocks— can all be 
argued as cases of market failure. The current stock 
of agricultural price stabilization policies includes 
both market-based and non-market-based options, 
with the former generally practiced in developed 
countries and the latter in developing countries.10 
A  summary of available policy options is provided 
in Table 1, and each of the options is discussed 
here.
Non-Market-Based Options
In the age of liberalization and globalization, a 
discussion of non-market-based policies is likely to 
be labeled outdated and old-fashioned. There are at 
least three important reasons, however, for such 
policies to be considered. First, non-market-based 
intervention does not contradict the theories of 
market economics. Economic theory tells us that, 
in the absence of the provision of public goods and 
services, the invisible hand of the market is incapa­
ble of ensuring efficient allocation of resources. In 
such a situation government interventions can 
theoretically be justified.1 * Second, existing World 
Trade Organization [W TO ] regulations allow devel­
oping countries to adopt non-market-based 
policies, including imposing variable levies within 
stipulated bands, maintaining strategic food 
reserves, and giving subsidies for market develop­
ment. Finally, although they have come under 
intense criticism in recent years, Asian countries 
had remarkable success with some of these policies 
during the early years of the Green Revolution. 
Table I summarizes four such policy options, and 
three of them are discussed here.
Governm ent involvem ent in  the sale and purchase 
oh hood. Direct government interventions, through 
the sale and purchase of food, have been the main 
mechanism for stabilizing food prices in developing
10 In some countries, such as India and Kenya, market- 
based and non-market-based policy options seem to co­
exist. Little is known, however, about how they affect 
each other.
1 The problem historically, however, has been over-inter­
vening in the market, often resulting from pressure from
special interests and rent seeking— a common problem 
some Asian countries are confronting today.
countries. The two most common forms of policy 
interventions are marketing board-led price stabili­
zation in many African economies and dual pricing 
policies in many Asian countries. These methods of 
price stabilization came under intense criticism in 
the 1980s and 1990s, because they were found to 
be extraordinarily expensive and yet ineffective in 
generating benefits for the poor [Bates 1981; 
Newbery and Stiglitz 1981; Pinstrup-Andersen 1988],
The dual pricing policies are perhaps the most 
widely discussed and debated form of agricultural 
policy in the past four decades. Unlike marketing 
board-led policies, these policies provided a much- 
needed boost to agricultural production and 
received recognition from policy makers, analysts, 
and academicians.12 The policy essentially works as 
follows: ensure a floor price (often equal to the 
cost of production] and a ceiling price (set by 
adding certain margins to the cost of production] 
through public food procurement, stocking, and 
distribution. The public procurement ensured a 
floor price (for instance, in the case of a bumper 
harvest], stocking ensured the meeting of emer­
gency food security needs, and distribution 
ensured a regular supply of food for social safety 
net programs for the poor.
Although it may sound simple, implementing dual 
pricing policies involves coordinating a complex set 
of policies, building related institutions, collecting 
highly disaggregated data, and monitoring both 
domestic and global prices. For instance, many 
Asian countries have agricultural price commissions 
that are responsible for collecting relevant data and 
setting up floor and ceiling prices; food logistics 
agencies that are responsible for procurement, 
stocking, and distribution; and a line ministry that 
designs safety net programs and identifies benefi­
ciaries.
How are dual pricing policies different from 
marketing board-led price control in centrally 
planned economies? They differ in three important 
respects. First, unlike centrally planned economies, 
food logistics agencies in Asia did not eliminate 
private trading in the agricultural sector. For exam­
ple, in the 1970s the food logistics agencies' shares 
in cereal production in India and Indonesia were 
only 10 percent and 3.54 percent, respectively
12 See Timmer [1988] and Barrett (2002, section 3] for a 
review.
(Rashid et al. 2005], The rest was traded by the 
private sector. Second, countries that practiced dual 
pricing policies never imposed production quotas 
on the farmers, a practice that was common in 
centrally planned economies. Finally, price stabiliza­
tion policies in Asia went hand in hand with 
investments in infrastructure and market develop­
ment. This approach is evident in the growth 
trends of road networks, irrigation facilities, and 
information and communication technologies. It is 
also supported by the recent studies of food 
market integration in Asia, almost all of which 
suggest that cereal markets have become well- 
integrated in the past two decades, which is 
remarkably different from the earlier decades when 
the countries embarked on dual pricing policies.13
Strategic fo o d  security reserves. The strategic food 
security reserve [SFSR] is a policy response to food 
security threats arising from weather-related disas­
ters [such as droughts and floods] or human- 
induced disasters (such as civil strife], both of 
which are prevalent in many developing countries 
in Africa and Asia. In Africa, maintaining SFSRs 
became a high-profile policy when the African 
heads of state and government passed a resolution 
establishing a regional food security reserve during 
the African Union summit held in Maputo, 
Mozambique, in July 2003. The rationales for main­
taining SFSRs are similar to those for price stabiliza­
tion, but they substantially differ from those for 
dual pricing policies. Although the focus of SFSR 
operation is mainly on emergency assistance and 
disaster management, dual pricing policies coordi­
nate policy action across economic sectors. In 
particular, in addition to maintaining security 
reserves for emergencies [commonly called buffer 
stocks in Asia], dual pricing policies link farmers, 
through the minimum price guarantee, and con­
sumers, through SSN, as part of the price stabiliza­
tion mechanism.
Implementing this policy raises a number of chal­
lenges. It can be expensive and have disincentive 
effects on producers and private traders if stocks 
are not rotated and released in a timely and 
market-friendly manner. The direct costs of 
managing such reserves are easy to understand with 
a simple example. Suppose that a country maintains 
450,000 metric tons of cereal reserves for
13 A  summary of these studies for six Asian countries is 
presented in Rashid et al. [2005].
emergency management and that policy makers 
know, based on historical evidence, that emergen­
cies occur once every four years. Now, inter­
national evidence suggests that the average cost of 
storing one metric ton of cereal is US$30 per year. 
That is, the cost of maintaining food security 
reserves is US$13.5 million per year or US$54.0 
million (over four years] to address one emergency. 
These are conservative estimates, because they 
exclude other costs, such as storage losses, disin­
centives, or even potential corruption or misuse of 
the stocks.
Does this mean that one should abandon such 
policies? The answer, as in any policy debate, 
depends on country-specific realities. If a country is 
well integrated with the international market and 
has the capacity to import, such policies are 
irrelevant. If, however, a country is landlocked and 
weakly integrated with regional or world markets, 
maintaining food reserves may be necessary to save 
human lives, to which no one can objectively attach 
a financial value. Thus the objective in such a situa­
tion will probably be to find ways to minimize the 
adverse effects. Four commonly advocated options 
are (I] announcing the sale or release price before 
the main planting season, [2] setting the price 
around the expected import parity price, [3] 
rotating the stock through sales at import parity 
and tendering for commercial imports, and [4] 
strengthening the legal framework to minimize the 
scope for corruption, such as collusion between 
traders and officials to exploit the system.
K triable tariffs. International trade, especially in­
volving the private sector, has long been recog­
nized as an efficient means of stabilizing domestic 
food prices. Trade flows add to domestic supplies 
in times of shortage (or provide additional markets 
in times of surplus], with adjustments in tariffs 
providing a mechanism to influence both traded 
quantity and prices.14 The key term in this state­
ment is "adjustment of tariffs." From the perspec­
tive of trade theory, high tariffs on any commodity 
can create distortions in the respective sectors.
14 See Minten and Dorosh (2006] for an analysis of rice 
price stabilization policy in Madagascar; Dorosh (2001] 
for an example of how private trade with India helped 
stabilize rice prices in Bangladesh; and Jha and Srinivasan 
(1999] for an analysis of the welfare and efficiency 
implications of Indian grain price policies.
Nevertheless, given the weak agricultural base and 
high instability of world cereal markets, most 
developing countries cannot afford to leave their 
agricultural markets completely open. For instance, 
if a bumper harvest in a country coincides with low 
import parity prices, domestic prices can be further 
depressed and farmers may fail to recover their 
production costs. In a resource-poor, agriculture- 
dependent country, such an outcome can be a big 
blow to the economy. This possibility is the 
underlying reason W T O  regulations allow devel­
oping countries to apply tariffs within a band. The 
critical condition required to make this policy via­
ble is a good market information system that can 
monitor both domestic and international prices, 
forecast domestic production, and allow for quick 
decisions on tariff adjustments.
Market-Bused Options
The market-based options and institutions used in 
most developed countries to mitigate price risk 
evolved in response to the conditions observable in 
many developing countries today. Writing on the 
history of futures markets in the United States, 
Kline (2001, 3] notes:
... grains were typically sown in the spring 
and harvested in the fall. In the 1800s, this 
created extreme supply and demand imbal­
ances throughout the year. During the fall, 
when supplies were plentiful, prices of 
grains were extremely depressed. Millers 
had an abundance of new crops to choose 
from and would pay the lowest price they 
could. In fact, many farmers were left with 
cartloads of unsold grains that they were 
not willing to haul back to their farms. 
Sometimes the grains were left on the 
roadside to rot.
This story is similar to what Ethiopian farmers 
experienced during the harvesting season of 2002, 
when prices were so low that many farmers 
allegedly did not find it worthwhile to harvest and 
hence left their crops in the field to rot. History 
offers many examples of this sort, but they never 
translated into policy action to develop market- 
based institutions in developing countries. The 
reasons were simple: developing countries did not 
have the technology and the institutions— such as 
credit, insurance, and contract enforcement— that 
are critical for the success of market-based 
mechanisms. In fact, it was not easy even for
developed countries. For example, although the 
first forward contract was made on March 13,1851, 
at the Chicago Board of Trade [CBOT), it was only 
in 1972 that the CBOT and the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange [CME] developed contracts that were 
able to hedge against currency and interest rate 
volatility [Kline 2001],
Now, however, technologies that were beyond the 
reach of developing countries, such as information 
and communication technologies, are becoming 
more affordable; banking and financial sectors can 
be developed rapidly; and new markets are emerg­
ing in Brazil, China, and India. These factors are 
creating unprecedented opportunities for develop­
ing countries to set up market-based institutions. 
Yet developing countries continue to face difficul­
ties in taking advantage of these opportunities.
W arehouse receipt system . The warehouse receipt 
system [WRS] is an institutional mechanism to miti­
gate some sources of price instability, namely credit 
constraints. A s mentioned earlier, one of the main 
reasons for observed low prices after harvest is the 
fact that farmers, especially small farmers, are 
forced to sell a portion of their harvest to pay for 
laborers, pay off loans, and meet other social obli­
gations. And when agriculture is dominated by 
smallholders, excess supply is created, which leads 
to depressed prices or even price collapse in certain 
years. If farmers were not credit constrained, they 
could store their harvest and wait for arbitrage 
opportunities over time. An  efficient WRS can help 
farmers do exactly that. The idea is simple. After 
the harvest, farmers take their surplus to a desig­
nated warehouse and get a receipt indicating the 
value of the stock, which can then be deposited in 
a bank to get cash.
Providing farmers with warehousing facilities in 
developing countries offers an added advantage. In 
most developing countries, post-harvest losses are 
high— sometimes as high as 30 percent of gross 
production. Consider the case of Ethiopia, where 
estimates of post-harvest losses range from 20 to 
30 percent of gross cereal production. Total gross 
production of cereal in the country is about 10 
million metric tons. Assuming an average cereal 
price of US$200 per ton, this implies that the 
country loses about US$400 million worth of 
cereals in a given year. W ith appropriate harvesting, 
warehousing, and postharvest techniques, these
losses could have been minimized, contributing to 
the well-being of both producers and consumers.
Com m odity exchanges and futures markets. The 
futures market as it exists today is a contractual 
arrangement where farmers [sellers] and dealers 
[buyers] commit to future exchanges of grain for 
cash. For example, a farmer may agree with a dealer 
on a certain price to deliver a given quantity of 
wheat at the end of a pre-fixed time. If the bargain 
suits both parties, the farmer knows how much she 
will be paid for the wheat and the dealer knows his 
costs in advance. The two parties may exchange a 
written contract to this effect and possibly a small 
amount of money representing a "guarantee."
Such contracts have become common and are even 
used as collateral for bank loans. They can also 
change hands before the delivery date. If the dealer 
decides he does not want the wheat, he can sell the 
contract to someone who does. Similarly, if the 
farmer does not want to deliver her wheat, she can 
pass her obligation on to another farmer. The price 
fluctuates depending on what is happening in the 
wheat market, and the participants can use the 
price information to react accordingly. In simple 
terms, this is how commodity futures work, but 
successful implementation requires [1] a system of 
grades and standards, [2] a large domestic market,
[3] well-functioning credit and insurance markets,
[4] a strong legal environment for contract 
enforcement, and [5] good information and com­
munication infrastructure.
Given these stringent viability conditions, can such 
a system work in a developing country? If the 
current Western level of sophistication is taken as 
standard, the answer is probably "no." Going back 
in history, however, offers grounds for optimism 
about the prospect. For example, in the mid-1800s, 
when commodity exchanges evolved in the United 
States, all the viability conditions listed were either 
missing or at a low level of sophistication. Yet the 
institutions evolved and even flourished over the 
past century and a half.15 Thus, if history is any 
indicator, commodity exchanges do have potential. 
The key challenges will be coping with small market 
size [most African countries have small markets]
15 The evolutionary path was not smooth though. The 
organization of commodity exchanges was held responsi­
ble for every inflationary and deflationary spiral, which 
led to two congressional investigations, in 1947 and 1948 
[Baer and Saxon 1949].
and creating an enabling legal and regulatory envi­
ronment, which many countries lack.
Crop insurance and weather-indexed insurance. 
Crop insurance is an income stabilization mechan­
ism, not a price stabilization scheme per se. Crop 
insurance comes in various forms— such as 
weather-indexed insurance, insurance against crop 
failure, and insurance against natural calamities and 
drought— and can be either a market-based or a 
non-market-based mechanism, depending on how a 
particular program operates. It can be termed 
market-based if it is self-sustaining with farmers 
buying the contract at a market-determined 
premium. On the other hand, it is a non-market- 
based mechanism if premiums are subsidized or 
paid either by governments or by their develop­
ment partners. Two questions are pertinent in this 
regard: Can crop insurance markets be feasible and 
self-sustaining in developing countries? And if they 
need to be subsidized, what justifies the subsidies? 
Hazell et al. (1986) deal with these questions exten­
sively. Their answer to the first question was that, 
even in developed countries, crop insurance was 
not fully sustainable and involved large subsidies. 
Referring to developing countries, they wrote:
...the costs of multiple risk crop insurance 
tend to be particularly high in developing 
countries. Large numbers of small farmers 
and wide diversity of agricultural practices 
greatly adds to administration and inspec­
tion costs. Poor data on actuarial risks and 
a lack of skilled personnel also hamper the 
writing and enforcement of contracts 
(Hazell et al. 1986, 295).
Despite these bottlenecks, a general answer to the 
second question is that subsidizing such a scheme 
can be justified at an early stage of development 
based on the argument of market failures. In the 
early 1980s there was growing interest in crop 
insurance in developing countries in Asia and Latin 
America, as well as a push from international 
organizations like the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO ), the 
United Nations Commission on Trade and Devel­
opment (UNCTAD ), and the Inter-American Insti­
tute for Cooperation on Agriculture, but very few 
countries (only Brazil, Costa Rica, and Mexico until 
the late 1980s) experimented with the policy.
Experiences with Various Policies
Food price stabilization programs in developing 
countries have been largely non-market-based— 
that is, they are implemented through direct 
government interventions. The most widely dis­
cussed and debated options are dual pricing 
policies, adopted by many Asian countries during 
the Green Revolution, and marketing board-led 
price controls in centrally planned economies. On 
the other hand, although they have been in 
existence for more than a century, market-based 
risk management instruments (such as warehouse 
receipts or commodity exchanges) have been intro­
duced only recently in developing countries. For 
the sake of brevity, this section provides only brief 
reviews of experiences with dual pricing policies in 
Asia and recent initiatives instituting agricultural 
commodity exchanges.16
Experiences with dual p ricin g  policies. Most Asian 
countries embarked on agricultural price stabiliza­
tion programs in the 1960s. Although implementa­
tion approaches varied, the economic realities and 
the underlying policy justifications were similar 
across countries. All the sources of price instability 
described in the "Background" section were signifi­
cant: agriculture was largely weather dependent, 
infrastructure was inadequate, risk management 
institutions were virtually nonexistent, and most 
countries were food deficient and hence food aid 
dependent. Therefore, policy thinking in all coun­
tries converged toward promoting agriculture to 
attain food self-sufficiency and improving agricul­
tural markets. W ith the fortunate appearance of 
Green Revolution technology, policy makers 
became convinced that the objectives were achiev­
able with appropriate government interventions 
that could mitigate the risks and uncertainties of 
new technology.
Dual pricing policies (ensuring floor and ceiling 
prices) were an outcome of that thinking. The main 
goals were to increase production, scale up social 
safety net programs, and maintain buffer stocks to 
ensure national food security. Alongside these 
efforts, governments also made investments to 
improve input supply, credit facilities, and rural 
infrastructure. The initial successes of these policies 
were remarkable in terms of increasing production, 
strengthening social safety net programs, and
16 For a review of experiences with marketing boards in 
Africa, see Bates (1981).
fueling overall growth (Rashid et al. 2005; 
Cummings et al. 2006).
Experiences over the years have varied, however, as 
some countries continued with the policies despite 
changes in the rationales that justify such 
interventions. Based on findings from six Asian 
countries (Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, 
Philippines, and Vietnam), a recent study concludes 
that the broad rationales for public intervention in 
these countries have changed over the years, 
although some countries continue to implement 
price stabilization policies more or less the same 
way as they did in the 1960s.17 The study shows 
that domestic markets are now well integrated, 
farmers have adopted new technologies, world 
cereal markets have matured, and all countries have 
adequate foreign currency reserves to participate in 
world markets at times of scarcity. The study 
further finds that although continued parastatal-led 
price policies have resulted in staggering increases 
in costs, liberalization has had beneficial impacts on 
the countries (Bangladesh and Vietnam) that 
pursued reforms.
Thus, the central message from the Asian 
experiences is that policy contexts are dynamic and 
policies need to be adjusted as contexts change. 
Many Asian countries failed to do so, which 
resulted in staggering amounts of subsidies and a 
distorted incentive structure for agriculture.
Experiences with agricultural com m odity exchanges. 
The use of market-based instruments began only 
recently in developing countries. W ith the excep­
tion of pilot initiatives for weather index-based 
insurance and warehouse receipts, the focus has 
been mainly on setting up commodity exchanges. 
Although commodity exchanges have been in exis­
tence for more than a century, the recent interest 
in setting them up in developing countries is trig­
gered by (I) the need for alternatives in the wake of 
market liberalization and (2) the enhanced availa­
bility and affordability of information and com­
munication technologies. In many countries, 
governments historically played key roles in pro­
viding market information, facilitating trade, and 
setting prices. W ith liberalization, there was a 
vacuum in these services, and many countries felt a 
need for price discovery and an efficient trading 
mechanism— needs that can ideally be met by
17 See Rashid et al. (2005) for details.
commodity exchanges. As a result, commodity 
exchanges have grown rapidly across the develop­
ing world over the past decade.
A  recent U N C TA D  review, however, suggests that 
experiences have been mixed. The key message 
from this review is that although the Asia-Pacific 
region, led by China and India, has succeeded in 
promoting commodity exchanges, Africa fared less 
well. In particular, except for South Africa, com­
modity exchanges either failed or had limited suc­
cess in other countries in the region. This outcome 
is clearly discouraging for African countries, where 
both yield variability and price variability are among 
the highest in the world. This finding has two 
important implications. First, the failure of market- 
based instruments will give governments a reason 
to reverse policies and return to those that are 
detrimental to market development and agricultural 
growth. Second, since such instruments succeeded 
in countries with higher levels of development 
(Brazil, China, India, and South Africa) and failed in 
others, it may be that a majority of developing 
countries are not ready to rely on commodity 
exchanges, or other market-based instruments, for 
managing price instability.
This suggests that some form of non-market-based 
mechanism might be necessary before these coun­
tries can rely on market-based options for food 
price risk mitigation. The question is, how? Histor­
ically, public interventions have had problems 
related to excessive control, which induces ineffi­
ciencies, and the capture of policies by special 
interests over time. Now development practitioners 
have almost half a century of experience to help 
them refine policies and design government inter­
ventions in supportive and market-friendly ways. 
Two considerations are worth noting in this con­
text: (1) leveling the playing field for both the pri­
vate and public sectors and (2) stabilizing prices 
within a broad band, not at fixed levels.
Leveling the playing field essentially means not 
empowering government agencies with regulatory 
supports, such as monopoly control, movement 
restrictions, and preferential access to credit. On 
the other hand, stabilizing prices within a band 
implies moving away from fixed pan-territorial and 
pan-seasonal pricing, which most countries have 
practiced, toward seasonally adjusted pricing. The 
problem with fixed pricing is that it can be dictated 
by special interests. For instance, in India the floor
price is set at the full cost of production, which 
includes the opportunity costs of labor, land, and 
equipment. As a result, over the years floor prices 
have gone up so much that floor prices in some 
months are higher than market prices. This out­
come clearly contradicts the very logic for the 
government's intervention, which is meant to pro­
tect farmers from extreme price swings, not to 
guarantee profits. If floor prices were set at the 
variable costs of production, the band would have 
been larger, selling to government would not have 
been so lucrative, and the private sector could have 
participated in the market.
Assignment
Your assignment is to consider a low-income, land­
locked country in Africa with poor infrastructure 
and to recommend a set of policies to the govern­
ment that would ensure an acceptable level of price 
stability for agricultural commodities. For decades, 
the country controlled agricultural prices through 
its marketing boards, which heavily distorted agri­
cultural production incentives. Beginning in 1999 
the country started dismantling its marketing 
boards and liberalizing agricultural markets. With 
liberalization, however, prices have become more 
volatile, and there has been increasing pressure on 
the government to undertake stabilization policies.
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Table 1: A  Syn o p sis o f  O p tio n s fo r  F o o d  P rice  Stab ilizatio n
Policy options Implementation approach




N on-m arket-based op tion s
Dual pricing Enforce floor and ceiling price; 
maintain buffer stocks; support SSNs; 
open market sales in case of price 
spikes.
Requires highly disaggregated info system on prices 
[domestic and world] and costs of production; well- 
designed SSNs; supplementary regulations. Worked well 
in the early years of Green Revolution in Asia.
It is expensive and likely to be dictated by 
special interests. If practiced for prolonged 
periods, it impedes growth of private sector.
Strategic food security reserves Maintain food reserves to manage 
emergencies; no formal enforcement 
of floor and ceiling price.
Requires management and analytical capacity in the 
implementing agency; efficient stock management; 
timely and market-friendly distribution and 
procurement
Difficult to manage; high costs of operation; 
can destabilize markets. If the size is large, it 
can crowd out private storage and limit 
arbitrage.
Variable levies Adjust import tariffs / export tax 
depending on domestic production 
and market conditions.
Requires good market intelligence on both domestic 
and world markets; capacity of the relevant authority to 
make quick decision and enforcements.
Can potentially be dictated by special 
interests; if governance is weak, lobbyists can 
influence the tariff decisions; does not work 




Public-private partnership; private 
sector uses public storage at 
subsidized price.
Requires limited availability of private storage and 
existence of large private stock from either individual 
traders or farmers' organizations; rule-based 
management to prevent traders / officials from 
colluding.
There is significant rent=seeking potential if 
government officials and private agents 
collude; can be politically unacceptable.
Market-based options
Warehouse receipts Farmers, traders, or processors take 
grain to a warehouse and get receipts, 
which are then used as collateral for 
borrowing from bank.
Requires grades and standards; strong legal 
environment for contract enforcement; well-functioning 
credit and insurance markets; volume of storage. Works 
well in combination with commodity exchanges.
Appropriate regulatory, legal, and business 
environment must be built; well-functioning 
credit and insurance markets needed. 
Potential for moral hazard, rent seeking.
Commodity exchange and futures 
markets
Sellers and buyers commit to future 
exchanges of grain for cash. For 
example, a farmer can agree with a 
trader on a price to deliver to him 
500 tons of maize at the end of a 
predefined time period. If the bargain 
suits both parties, the farmer knows 
the exact price and the trader knows 
his costs and benefits.
Requires an enabling legal and regulatory environment; 
strong financial sector; functioning credit and insurance 
markets; systems of grades and standards; sizable 
domestic markets.
The biggest challenges for most African 
countries are lack of an enabling environment 
and small market size [trade volume].
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Weather-indexed insurance It is not a price stabilization instrument 
per se but can mitigate the price spikes 
and weather-related income shocks. 
Insurance policies are sold [or 
subsidized by the government or 
donors] to farmers. If the index falls 
below certain level, farmers are paid for 
the crop loss.
Requires strong legal and financial institutions; 
disaggregated rainfall data to create weather index.
Requires strong analytical and forecasting 
capacity. Formulating payout amount can be 
complicated by agroclimatic conditions. 
Potential for moral hazard.
International futures market Developing countries use international 
futures markets to manage risks.
Requires participation of large farmers, traders, or 
intermediaries [such as farmers' organizations]; or 
direct participation of the government. Has proved 
successful in some countries, such as for cocoa in 
Ghana and coffee in Guatemala.
Requires significant training and capacity 
strengthening of participating groups, 
including the government officials in the 
executing agencies.
Source: Compiled from various sources.
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